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Abstract
Ideally we would like experimental subjects to be perfect strangers
so that the situation they face at the lab is not just part of a long
run interaction. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach those conditions
and experimenters try to mitigate any effects from these out-of-the-lab
relationships by, for instance, randomly matching subjects. However,
even if this type of procedure is used, it cannot be excluded that a
subject may face a friend or an acquaintance. For the dictator game
we find evidence that a positive probability of playing with a friend
is not relevant to experimental results. However, when subjects are
certain to face a friend they give more.
Keywords: experimental procedures, friendship effect, dictator
game, fairness.
JEL Class.: C99, D63, D64.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the effects of between-subjects social distance in dic-
tator games (DG hereafter). Our first objective is to check an extremely
intuitive conjecture: If the average behavior of dictators is to share their en-
dowment with unknown recipients, they should be willing to offer a greater
share to a friend. We explore whether there is such a “friendship effect” on
giving. The study of this effect continues the path opened by previous work
showing that reducing the dictators-recipients social distance in DG increases
mean offers (e.g., Bohnet & Frey [1], Hoffman et al. [14], Charness & Gneezy
[7]).
However, we go a step further, in the sense that matching friends in a DG
would imply a more drastic reduction of the between-subjects social distance
than providing family names or physical identification. If there is a causal link
between social distance and agents’ taste for fairness, our conjecture is that
giving should increase dramatically. Our findings show that this is indeed
the case. Mobius et al. [16] deals with a similar topic. After the elicitation
of a social network they match dictators with their friends in order to check
the presence of a friendship effect. The key difference is that they also give
dictators the recipient’s identity.1 Under that setting they find a positive
and significant friendship effect.
The second objective is a methodological concern. In an attempt to
guarantee that the situation agents face at the lab is not just part of a long
run interaction unknown to the researcher, agents are matched randomly
and between-subjects anonymity is preserved in standard DG. Nevertheless,
there is a positive probability that a subject is paired with a friend or an
acquaintance. Indeed, there is probably no mistake in assuming that the
standard recruitment procedure based on a public call does not exclude that
groups of friends decide to go together to the laboratory.
On this basis, and given that friendship has a large effect over giving in
DG, a reasonable hypothesis is that the possibility of friends being paired
together in a random matching procedure may increase dictators’ taste for
fairness. If this is so, the presence of friends in the subject pool could be
an uncontrolled variable that affects the agents’ decisions and experimental
economics should control for it. If this effect is irrelevant, that is definitely
1This information on the recipient’s identity implies that there is no anonimity between
subjects and that there is a “large” room for reciprocity.
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good news!
This methodological concern is not completely unknown to the experi-
mental literature. Charness et al. [8](p. 2) state:
“In the typical laboratory setting, participants can see each other
(....), share common traits (e.g., school, age group, nationality),
and may well be friends or acquaintances. Perhaps the willing-
ness to sacrifice money to affect someone else’s material reward
is an artifact of the physical and emotional proximity of the ex-
perimental subject pools”.
Nevertheless, by comparing dictators’ allocations in a friend-free context
with other results in the DG literature, our conclusion is that the presence of
friends in the subject pool2 is irrelevant in DG. Thus, even if experimental
protocols do not cancel the positive probability of matching couples of friends
in the roles of dictator and recipient, the presence of friendship relations in
the subject pool does not seem to contaminate significantly the results in
standard DG.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to previous experi-
mental works focused on the effects of modifying social distance. Section 3
describes the design and procedures. In section 4, we analyze the strength
of the friendship effect, and the fifth section deals with the implications of
having just a positive probability of being matched with a friend. Section 6
concludes.
2 The recipient is your friend
This paper explores social distance measure by the degree of relationship
between subjects.
In recent years, there has been a large number of dictator game papers
which analyze several aspect of social distance (including both procedures
and information about the recipient) as determinants of giving.
Seminal papers on this regard focused on whether and how the experimen-
ters-subjects social distance may affect altruistic behavior. Hoffman et al.
[13] and [14], Bolton et al. [2] and Frohlich et al. [12], among others, are
good examples of this literature.
2Excluding the case where all the recipients are dictators friends.
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Another stream of work studied between—subjects social distance. For in-
stance, Eckel and Grossman [9] informed the dictator who the recipient was:
the local Red Cross. Bohnet and Frey [1] had (among other treatments) dic-
tators who could identify their recipients. In Charness & Gneezy [7] subjects
knew the family name3 of their counterparts. In the same vein, Burnham [5]
gave dictators recipients photographs. Frohlich et al. [12] conducted a DG
in just one room4 —but under double-blind conditions— as a way to reduce
dictators-recipients social distance.
All the above experiments showed that the smaller the social distance
the larger giving. However, in a attempt to study the opposite effect, Johan-
nesson and Persson [15] use as recipients randomly selected Swedish citizens
who did not know they were participating in an economics experiment. They
show that this larger social distance has not a significant effect on results.
In sum, social distance may be affected by informing dictators about
recipient’s attributes. Making dictators play with a friend is a means to
minimize such distance. Mobius et al. [16] analyze DG within social net-
works: dictators know they are matched with a particular friend and, as a
consequence, giving increases. Our paper continues this line of research.
3 Design and procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Granada (Spain) in Jan-
uary 2006. Subjects were first-year undergraduate Economics students. The
possibility to participate in an economics experiment was announced in class
to first year students. Since we needed a list of friends for each subject, it
was more likely to find it within the same class. However, participation was
voluntary. Students wishing to participate were invited to go to a nearby
room.
We were extremely careful in preserving subjects—experimenter distance.
To do so the experiment: i) was conducted by assistants who did not have
any contact with the students before or after the experiment, ii) instructions
3Name is not a trivial information. Fershtman and Gneezy [10] conducted a DG with
Israeli Jewish students (dictators) who were informed about the recipients’ name. Names
were a source of ethnic information however, results indicated that there is no clear sys-
tematic “taste for ethnic discrimination”.
4Instead of a room A for dictators and a room B for recipients, they placed all of them
within the same room.
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(see appendix) indicated that the experiment was coordinated by a professor
of the Universidad del País Vasco (1000 kms. far from Granada) and iii) we
used double—blind procedures.
To analyze the strength of the friendship effect we use two treatments of
a DG: dictators played either with a friend (Tf hereafter) or with a classmate
who had not been included in their list of friends (Ts hereafter). To obtain the
list of friends for each participant in the experiment, subjects were asked to
write down the name of classmate friends on the answer sheet (see appendix).
Up to this moment, no information about the type of decisions they would
take afterwards had been provided. However, since we were interested in
subjects revealing close friends, the instructions stated that they might have
the chance to benefit one of the friends in their list, and that the more friends
were listed, the lower the chances of helping a particular individual would
be.
We use this benefit—your—friend incentive device in order to get a true
mapping of personal relationships. Although our mechanism is not as so-
phisticated as Mobius et al. [16] we got a 50.1% of correspondence5 (between
links) vs. their 37.7%.
Our experiment tries to determine whether friendship affects dictators’
taste for generosity. Note, however, that the degree of friendship elicited does
not necessarily coincide with the highest level possible: the best friends of our
subjects could be outside the first year class list. Furthermore, no measure
of friendship strength is provided (for such a measure see Brañas-Garza et
al. [4] and Mobius et al. [16]). Nevertheless, this is the kind of friendship
level we can expect to find in most experiments run at laboratories.
All the participants were assigned the role of dictators, either in Tf or in
Ts and were placed in the same room. In Tf subjects were informed that the
recipient would be randomly chosen from their list of friends. In Ts they were
informed that they would be matched to a recipient randomly selected from
the entire class list, excluding the friends that they had named. Dictators
did not provide their names6 and all of them were also potential recipients.
During the experiment, instructions were read aloud. Subjects were al-
lowed to ask questions in private. They were not allowed to communicate
5Part of the non—corresponded links were due to the fact that some students in the
class list were absent and could not correpond.
6However we can trace them. Under the current data protection laws we have to ask
subjects to fill an informed consent form. With this form the give us permission to use
their choices for research purposes. Obviously forms are signed.
5
between them. First, participants revealed their list of friends. Second, they
played a DG.
At the beginning subjects received two 11.5×22.3 cms. (4.5×8.8. inch.)
envelopes included within the hand-out package. One of them was empty
and the other contained ten 50 eurocents coins.7 Subjects were informed
that their decision task was to divide the whole endowment of ten coins
between them and another subject in whatever way they wished. Then, they
read on the instruction sheet whether their recipient would be a friend in
their list (Tf) or someone from the entire friend-free class list (Ts).
To avoid any doubts about recipients getting the money (see Frohlich et
al. [12]), the commitment to pay recipients in private the day after (and the
place) was announced publicly.
To divide the pie in practice, subjects were asked to put the money that
they wish to donate in the empty envelope, seal it, leave it on the table and
leave the room. The rest of the money was for them to keep. Participants
were able to take their decision confidentially given the space left between
subjects.
The total amount of money collected, from donations, was given to the
recipients the day after the experiment, once all the random-matching process
was over.
The sample comprises 53 subjects: 27 participated in treatment Ts and
26 in Tf . On average, dictators earned 5.45 euros8 (including 2 euros show-up
fee) for a 20 minutes session. Recipients, without any task or effort received
1.5 euros on average.
To simplify the exposition and the comparison with other related papers
our results are presented in terms of the number of coins.
4 The friendship effect
Table 1 shows some data on the number of friends listed by subjects. As
outstanding features note, first, that decision makers listed 2.79 friends on
average. Second, almost half of the subjects included 2 or 3 (the modal
value) friends in their list, and about 6% listed 6 friends or more. Third, the




maximum number of friends revealed was 7. Finally the level of correspon-
dence among links (50.1%) indicates that the benefit—your—friend device was
successful in eliciting the true social network.
Table 1: Number of Friends
Frequency
n Mean 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
49 2.79 5 8 11 13 5 8 3
(9%) (15%) (21%) (25%) (9%) (15%) (6%)
The 53 participants were randomly assigned between treatments: 26 to
Tf and 27 to Ts. Four of those five subjects who did not list any friend
were in treatment Tf .9 The distributions of subjects’ offers in Tf and Ts are
shown in Table 2. On average, dictators offered 2.48 when the recipient was
a classmate, whereas they gave 3.68 when the recipient was a listed friend.
Thus, reducing between-subjects social distance by matching friends yields an
increase of almost 50% in the amount given.
Furthermore, the frequency distributions are inverted, in the sense that
68% of the subjects offered 4 or more in Tf , whereas 70% gave 3 or less in
Ts. Hence, we can conclude that giving in DG is definitely sensitive to the
friendship effect.
Table 2: Giving in Tf and Ts
Frequency
T n Mean 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Tf 22 3.68 3 0 2 2 5 9 1
(14%) (0%) (9%) (9%) (23%) (45%) (4%)
Ts 27 2.48 5 2 6 6 5 3 0
(19%) (7%) (22%) (22%) (19%) (11%) (0%)
Both the Mann-Whitney (Z = −2.590; p = 0.01) and the Kolmogorov—
Smirnov (Z = 1.342; p = 0.05) tests reject the null hypothesis that the
9Since these 4 dictators could not be matched to a friend, their decisions have been
excluded from the data set. Two of these subjects gave 1 coin; one of them gave 3; and
the last one gave 4 coins.
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distributions of dictators’ giving in Tf and Ts are drawn from the same pop-
ulation. Figure 1 shows that the cumulative distribution function of giving
in Ts stochastically dominates that in Tf .







0 1 2 3 4 5+
friends strangers
Therefore:
Result 1.- Friendship increases donations.
A step further could be to explore the role of social networking (that
the whole spectrum of social relations) on giving. A sensible conjecture is
that giving is not completely unrelated to agent’s social capital. That is, the
level of generosity they show would seem to be correlated with the number
of friends they name (degree—out in network theory terminology). A regres-
sion analysis, with constant and controlling by treatment, indicates that the
number of friends is a positive and significant, for α = 10%, determinant of
giving (see Brañas-Garza and Espinosa [3] and Brañas-Garza et al. [4] for
details).
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5 Should experimenters be concerned about
the friendship effect?
Result 1 provides support to the idea that subjects’ taste for altruism is
sensitive to social distance. In particular, when social distance is as small as
that between two friends, subjects give more in DG.
Furthermore, this evidence has been obtained for the type of friendship
characterizing relationships between undergraduate students. This friendship
relation is likely to be similar to those observed between students who
come together to the lab.
As a result of the strength of this effect, we could ask whether, in a
standard DG, decisions may be influenced by dictators knowing that there is
a positive probability of being matched with a friend. If this were the case,
there would be an uncontrolled friendship-effect affecting giving.
In a regular DG no mechanism is used to elicit the social mapping so that
we may not exclude previous interactions (links) among players.10 However
participant in Ts knew that their recipients were randomly selected from a
friend-free pool; that is, dictators were certain about the fact that they were
not going to be matched to a friend.
To check whether the friendship-effect is important in practice —where the
probability of being matched to a friend is never equal to one— the results
obtained in Ts are compared to those of a standard DG. The idea is to
compare the results in a DG where the dictators’ friends were excluded in
the matching process with those DGs where this variable was not controlled
for.
In particular, the comparison can be made between our Ts and a number
of well-known DG’s: Forsythe et al. [11] (FHSS hereafter); Hoffman et al.
[14] (HMSS) and Frohlich et al [12] (FOM).
There are some interesting features regarding each DG. For instance,
FHSS uses two monetary sizes: a US$10 stake (labelled FHSS) and a US$5
(FHSS-5); Frohlich et al. [12] uses single and double rooms (FOM and FOM-
2 respectively) whereas Hoffman et al. [14] is the benchmark regarding strict
conditions, in the sense that subjects are not induced to behave socially.11
10Indeed, the use of “public calls” as recruitment procedures is likely to result in a
subject pool containing groups of friends.
11Frohlich et al. [12] motivated their paper saying that conditions —in HMSS
experiment— were so strict that people did not believe even that recipients existed.
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Table 3 shows the distributions of dictators’ offers in Ts and the referred
papers.
Table 3: Ts and other DGs
Ts FHSS FHSS-5 HMSS FOM FOM-2
0 5 5 16 23 6 8
1 2 4 0 7 2 4
2 6 3 13 2 2 1
3 6 7 2 1 0 2
4 5 0 4 0 0 5
5+ 3 5 10 3 7 2
n 27 24 45 36 17 22
Mean 2.4 2.3 2.2 0.8 2.4 2.7
Median 3 2.5 2 0 2 1
Mode 2− 3 3 0 0 0− 5 0
St. dev. 1.62 1.78 2.04 1.47 2.40 3.13
Max 5 5 6 5 6 10
The first conclusion stemming from the experimental data is that, with
the remarkable exception of HMSS, mean offers in all the treatments take
very similar values.12
A battery of Mann-Whitney tests supports that Ts is not different from
FMSS (Z = −0.34; p = 0.72), FMSS-5 (Z = −0.73; p = 0.46), FOM
(Z = −0.06; p = 0.95) and FOM-2 (Z = −0.25; p = 0.79) but differs from
HMSS (Z = −4.0; p = 0.00). Hence, there are no differences among samples
except for the last one.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reports identical results.13 Thus we can
conclude that there are no differences in behavior between dictators facing
a sample of stranger recipients and those in the standard DGs —without any
control for friends.
12In HMSS-5 two subjects gave 6 coins and in FOM-2 two subjects gave the whole
endowment, 10 coins.
13Ts is not different from FMSS (Z = 0.41; p = 0.99), FMSS-5 (Z = −0.70; p = 0.71),
FOM (Z = 0.97; p = 0.30) and FOM-2 (Z = 0.99; p = 0.27) but differs from HMSS
(Z = 2.25; p = 0.00).
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Recall that dictators in Ts were well aware that they were not going to
be paired to a friend but they behaved in a similar way to dictators that
were uncertain about whether they would be matched with a friend. Hence,
it seems that knowing that there is a positive probability of being matched
with a friend does not affect giving in DG.
Result 2.- (in DG) Controlling for friendship relationships among subjects
is not necessary.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper is a contribution to the stream of research that focuses on how
between-subjects social distance is related to dictators’ decisions. Specifi-
cally, it shows how an important modification of the social distance does
affect subjects’ concern for generosity. Our results indicate that the taste for
altruism is substantially increased when friends play the role of recipients.
Our finding that the friendship effect is significant leads to the question
of the impact of a positive probability of being matched with a friend, as
it is the case in most laboratory experiments. Fortunately, we did not find
such an effect: our findings with friend-free subject pools are not significantly
different from standard results in the DG literature. This is good news for
experimenters!
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Appendix: Experimental instructions14
You are going to participate in an Economics Experiment. For your par-
ticipation you get the 2 euros that have been placed on your desk. This
work is coordinated by a researcher at the University of the Basque Country.
She asks you for your cooperation during the experiment. The aim of this
experiment is to study how individuals take decisions in certain contexts.
Instructions are simple. If you carefully follow them, you could earn an ad-
ditional amount of money at the end of the experiment; this amount will be
paid in private (no one will know how much you have earned). You are al-
lowed to ask questions to the monitors at any moment during the experiment.
To call monitors, raise your hand. Any communication between participants
is strictly forbidden and would imply the exclusion from the experiment.
Three qualifications are in order before proceeding.
First, the money you will be using DOES NOT belong to the researchers,
it has been provided by the Spanish government for scientific purposes.
Second, not all of the participants face the same decision problem; three
different experiments are been conducted in this room.
Last, you can check that your name will not be asked —exception made
of the consent form, that is a legal requirement. Everything is confidential.
The experiment is divided in different phases that are explained below in
detail.
(Phase 1) Group of friends: We need you to give us a list of classmate
friends. There is a chance that if you list them here they will participate in
the experiment with you and could benefit from your decisions. ‘Your list’
will be the basis to randomly select those individuals.
“Please, write down your list of friends below. If you do not list any
friend, then, we will randomly select any classmate and you will not have
the chance to benefit a friend. The number of marks that appear below
does not determine the number of friends you have to list. Feel free to name
as many friends as you wish. Remember though that the higher the number
of friends you list, the lower the chances of beneffiting a particular friend of
yours are.










(Phase 2) The decision problem: One of the envelopes on your desk
contains ten 0.5 euro coins (real money). This money has been provisionally
allocated to you and another subject. You have to decide how to divide those
10 coins between the other subject and you. Any allocation is possible, even
that in which you keep everything for yourself and the other subject gets
nothing. Your task is to take the decision you wish.
Who are you going to be matched with? Your partner will be
RANDOMLY selected from the friends you have included in your list (YOUR
list).
[In Ts: Who are you going to be matched with? Your partner will
be RANDOMLY selected from the class list, excluding your friends (those
included in YOUR list)].
You will divide the money in the following way. Since you have two
envelopes, put in one of them the amount of money you want to leave for
your partner, and in the other one, the amount you want to take with you.
You just have to leave on the desk the first envelope. You take with you the
other one. Whatever amount of money there is in it, it is something you will
be the only one to know.
PLEASE, do not forget to fill in, sign and leave on the table the consent
form. It is a legal requirement. Thank you for participating.
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